Introduction
Modern control technology allows system analysis and control through a variety of techniques in time and frequency domains. Decision making in predefined situations has also been implemented using expert systems and rule-based control systems. For example, in [1] , a fault monitoring and diagnosis expert system is described to assist pilots in handling in-flight faults. In [2] , an expert system is described for control system design that would be a useful tool to handle sudden structural changes. These so-called intelligent faultmonitoring systems operate as qualitative systems, i.e., they reason by use of a symbolic knowledge representation. Fault monitoring systems must interact with the real physical world that operates on quantitative, i.e., continuous-time, sensory and actuator signals. To this end, sensory information obtained from the plant to be monitored needs to be discretised before it can be used by the reasoning system, and often, the discrete decisions reached by the intelligent system need to be translated back to smooth real-valued control decisions.
that neither a purely quantitative nor a strictly qualitative model may be able to solve on its own. Modern approaches to fault diagnosis include the so-called model-based approach [4] . This [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , namely the numerical model of a B-747 aircraft, is used to compare the obtained results.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In order for the work to be self-contained, Section 2 summarises the FIR methodology except for the qualitative simulation engine that, for convenience, shall be explained in Section 5. Section 3 provides a short summary of previous research efforts [5] and [9] , and then briefly explains the quantitative model of the aircraft as well as the qualitative models obtained with FIR. In Section 4, a modified experiment using the same aircraft model is proposed, and then, in Section 4.1, the technique used in [5] and [9] to perform fault detection is applied to the new data for the purpose of comparing its results with the newly presented approach. In Section 5, a new concept in the FIR methodology context is introduced, first presented in [10] , and applied to the detection of faults in the modified example. Section 6 is left for the conclusions.
Fuzzy Inductive Reasoning Methodology
Inductive reasoning (IR) is an inductive modelling technique designed by Klir [11] as part of his General System Problem Solving (GSPS) framework. IR was first implemented by Uyttenhove [12] during his PhD dissertation research. This implementation was called Systems Approach Problem Solver (SAPS). An improved version of the original SAPS program was developed by Cellier and Yandell [13] and later extended by Li and Cellier [14] to offer fuzzy reasoning capabilities. Accordingly, the enhanced methodology is now called Fuzzy Inductive Reasoning [15] .
In the sequel, a number of different authors used FIR to qualitatively model and simulate different kinds of systems and time series, while constantly improving the methodology [7, 16, 17, 18] . Concretely in [17] A detailed description of how the quality of each mask is computed is given in [20] . The optimal mask offers a good compromise between a complexity and an uncertainty reduction measure. It chooses those inputs, at given delays, that best model the observed output.
Once the optimal mask has been found, it can be used to flatten dynamic relations into static ones. The mask can be shifted over the matrices that represent the recoded data system; in each mask position, the selected m-inputs and m-output can be extracted from the data system, and can be written next to each other in a static record. At this point every row of the obtained matrix represents a fuzzy rule. Static records can then be sorted alphabetically. Figure 1 illustrates this process.
This operation is done with the three recoded matrices : the class, membership and side matrices, separately. Consequently, three behaviour matrices are obtained. Together, the three behaviour matrices constitute a set of fuzzy rules that FIR automatically synthesises from the training data and the optimal mask. These behaviour matrices as well as the optimal mask are used in the qualitative simulation engine. [7, 8, 9 ].
An improved method based on fuzzy inductive reasoning is presented in this paper with the aim of fault detection. Fuzzy inductive reasoning and what is now called envelope detection, to be explained in Section 5, are used here. As will be shown, using envelopes improves the fault detection approach, allowing the detection of faults at an earlier stage, and even the detection of faults that are not detected using either of the previous two approaches.
A numerical model of the B-747 aircraft has been used to generate episodes of the five variables shown in Figure 2 . Two input variables, the variation in the elevator deflection A8trim and the variation in the thrust ATtrim, and three output variables, the lift L, drag D, and the flight path angle GA, are considered. The mathematical model used is exactly the same that was reported in [5, 6] . This [5] can be tackled in the same way.
The simulation of the quantitative model is performed using ACSL (Advanced Continuous Simulation Language, [21] [6] and [9] . Although the former technique used a crisp inductive reasoner, whereas the latter used an improved fuzzy inductive reasoner, the fault was, in both cases, detected using information about the class values only.
The performed instantaneous parameter change implies a sharp transient in the variables taken into account. This transient was used to detect the aeroplane malfunction, so in some way, the methodology did not really detect the model change, but rather the highly dramatic transition phase between the two models.
For instance, Figure 3 Figure 4 shows the change in the output variable D when the parameter values change smoothly.
Crisp Detection Using Smoothed Data
In order to compare the effectiveness of the new fault detection scheme, based on the so-called envelopes, with previous results, in this section the fault detection method presented in [6] and [9] is summarised and applied to the smooth parameter change explained in the previous section.
By using the numerical ACSL aircraft model, quantitative data representing the real system in a fault situation are gathered. The If any of these values, at a given point of time, passes the threshold (m) of the alarm module, an alarm is immediately triggered, i.e., a fault has been detected. Figure 5 illustrates the process. [6] and [9] , and subsequently, they were employed to monitor a smooth change in the aircraft parameters as explained in Section 4.
Sudden Change Detection
The method of the acceptability envelope of the variables has been applied to the case of an instantaneous change in the aeroplane parameters. Figure 8 The fault alarm vector has been obtained using a threshold of m = 5 and an error window of depth 5. - Notice that the accident is detected at time instant 2503, only three seconds after it took place, and the -0 fault remains flagged ever after. The new method of the envelopes is hence reported to detect the malfunction at an earlier time than the approach proposed in [6] and [9] . Moreover decreasing the probability of a true emergency being mistaken for a false alarm. Table 3 summarises the results that have been obtained using the method of the envelopes when using two different alarm thresholds: m = 5 and m = 2 and an error window of depth 5. In order to make it easy to compare the results with those obtained using fuzzy inductive reasoning together with crisp fault detection, as presented in [9] , the two left-most columns of Table 3 show the results obtained with the method of envelopes, whereas the two right-most columns reproduce the results discussed in [6, 9] smoothly, the malfunction is detected using error threshold values that do not permit a fault detection using the crisp detection method. Moreover, the detection is more robust, since for a given threshold, the existing fault remains flagged, whereas using the crisp method the alarm disappears again, making it likely that the true emergency would be interpreted by the flight engineer as a false alarm.
